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ARTICLES
GILES v. CALIFORNIA: SIXTH AMENDMENT
CONFRONTATION RIGHT, FORFEITURE BY
WRONGDOING, AND A MISGUIDED DEPARTURE
FROM THE COMMON LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION
Ralph Ruebner* & Eugene Goryunov**t

I. INTRODUCTION

T

HE debate about the nature of the Sixth Amendment confrontation
rights of the criminally accused has been lively in recent years. The
United States Supreme Court addressed a key confrontation issue definitively
during its most recent term in its controversial opinion in Giles v. California.I
The issue in Giles was whether intent to prevent live in-court testimony is a
necessary element of the constitutional forfeiture analysis. State courts had been
split on this point for a number of years. 2 Many, including the California
Supreme Court in People v. Giles, rejected the element of intent. 3 Conversely,
some, including the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Stechly, mandated the
inclusion an intent element.4 In Giles, the U.S. Supreme Court sided with the
seeming minority view and held that unconfronted out-of-court statements are
admissible only where the witness is unavailable as a direct result of conduct that
Ruebner, Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois.
** Eugene Goryunov, J.D. (2008).
t The authors would like to thank Laura Howard, J.D. (2008), for her valuable editorial
efforts. The authors would also like to thank Professor Colin Miller of The John Marshall Law
School for his very instructive review of this article.
1. Giles III, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
2. See, e.g., People v. Giles (Giles I1), 152 P.3d 433, 443 (Cal. 2007) (holding that intent is
not a required element for forfeiture by wrongdoing), vacated, Giles III, 128 S. Ct. 2678; State v.
40 n.13, 727 N.W.2d 518,
40 n.13
40 n.13, 299 Wis. 2d 267,
Jensen, 2007 WI 26,
(distinguishing forfeiture from waiver in that forfeiture does not require intent). But see, e.g.,
People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333, 372 (Ill. 2007) (holding that intent is required for the forfeitureby-wrongdoing doctrine); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 (Mass. 2005) (holding
that forfeiture by wrongdoing requires: (1) declarant's unavailability; (2) that defendant was
involved in, or responsible for, procuring the unavailability; and (3) that defendant intended to
procure such unavailability).
3. Giles II, 152 P.3d at 443.
4. 870 N.E.2d 333, 372 (Ill. 2007).
*Ralph
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was intended by the accused to render the witness unavailable for live in-court
testimony.5
In this article, we contend that the common law does not support including
the element of intent in the forfeiture analysis under the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Giles misreads the common-law cases as
requiring intent to procure unavailability before a court may apply forfeiture by
wrongdoing. 6 Our analysis of the historical record demonstrates that the English
common-law judges who fashioned the forfeiture doctrine and American courts
that further explained the principle did not make intent to render unavailable an
element of the confrontation exception.
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution fully protects the criminally
accused afainst the admissibility of an unavailable declarant-witness's
testimonial out-of-court statement where the accused did not have a prior
opportunity to cross-examine him or her. 8 To best serve the interests of justice, a
prosecutor must be allowed to introduce a testimonial out-of-court statement
when the accused forfeits the right of confrontation by his or her own voluntary
and wrongful conduct. This must be the case even if the accused did not have a
prior opportunity to cross-examine the out-of-court declarant. There are a
number of such situations that render a witness unavailable to present live incourt testimony, including the murder of the out-of-court declarant, intimidation
of the declarant, improper payments or other inducements to the declarant,
concealment of the declarant's whereabouts, or persuasion of the declarant to
absent himself or herself from the trial. 9
In these circumstances, where the prosecution establishes that the accused
caused or procured the declarant's unavailability, the dispositive constitutional
question is not whether the accused intended to prevent the out-of-court
declarant's testimony, but whether the accused's voluntary wrongful conduct
actually caused the out-of-court declarant to be unavailable for live in-court
testimony. Thus, the constitutional forfeiture rule is an equitable principle that
allows the use of a declarant's out-of-court statement without distinction as to
whether it is a pre-crime statement, a statement made during the crime, or a postcrime statement.10 As a result, a statement's relevancy is the only remaining
limitation to admissibility."
5. Giles 11, 128 S. Ct. at 2687.
6. See id at 2682-86.
7. The Confrontation Clause only limits the admissibility of testimonial hearsay statements,
which are defined as "pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
8. Id. at 59.
9. Methods defendants employ to "procur[e] or coerc[e] silence from witnesses and victims"
is wrongful forfeiture of the constitutional right to confrontation, See Davis v. Washington, 126 S.
Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006).
10. Crawford,541 U.S. at 62.
11. There is a concern that without an intent element the forfeiture doctrine may render the
"dying declaration" hearsay exception meaningless. We suggest that this argument is without merit
because a dying declaration is most likely not testimonial, and therefore falls outside the parameters
of the Confrontation Clause. See id. at 56 n.6 (stating that the dying-declaration exception to the
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Part II of this article examines the development of the doctrine of forfeiture
by wrongdoing in common law, concluding that the common law did not include
an intent element. Part III discusses the U.S. Supreme Court's recognition of the
forfeiture doctrine and examines the differences between forfeiture and waiver.
Next, in part IV, we survey different jurisdictions' approaches to the forfeiture
doctrine, focusing on whether the jurisdictions include an intent element. Some
courts, like the California Supreme Court, do not require a showing of intent in
applying the forfeiture doctrine, while others, like the Illinois Supreme Court, do.
Part V analyzes the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Giles v. California,
which misguidedly resolved the split in favor of requiring a showing of intent.
To further support our contention that the forfeiture doctrine does not require
intent, in part VI we clarify the difference between the confrontation rights of the
Sixth Amendment and the residual exception to hearsay under the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Last, we conclude that requiring an element of intent in forfeiture
analysis is inconsistent with the common law at the time of the nation's founding.
II. THE ENGLISH AND EARLY AMERICAN COMMON-LAW DOCTRINE OF
FORFEITURE BY WRONGDOING DID NOT RECOGNIZE AN INTENT REQUIREMENT
The doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing was first developed in
12
seventeenth-century England as a means of preventing witness tampering.
Early English cases focused on the accused's post-crime attempts to prevent the
trial testimony of a previously deposed witness. 13 The first time a court applied
the doctrine was during the 1666 murder trial of Lord Morley before the British
House of Lords.' 4 Before the trial began, the Law Lords met at Serjeants-Inn on15
Fleet-Street to discuss the evidentiary issues that they thought may arise at trial.
At that meeting, they agreed that if a previously examined witness were absent
from trial and the court found that the absent witness "was detained 16by means or
procurement of the prisoner ... then the examination might be read."'
During the trial, Thomas Snell, an apprentice who had provided an
incriminating deposition to the coroner, disappeared. 7 His master, Thomas
Harding, testified that Snell told him that "the Lord Morley's Trial was to be
shortly but he would not be there."' 8 While Snell clearly disappeared in
anticipation of the upcoming trial, the court did not read the deposition because
the evidence was not sufficient to show that the accused procured Snell's
rules of evidence is sui generis). See generally Michael J. Polelle, The Death of Dying
Declarationsin a Post-Crawford World, 71 Mo. L. REv. 285 (2006).
12. James F. Flanagan, Confrontation, Equity, and the Misnamed Exception for "Forfeiture"
by Wrongdoing, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1193, 1214 (2006).

13. Id.
at 1205.
14. King v. Morley (Lord Morley's Case), (1666) 6 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B.). Lord Morley was
indicted for running his sword through the head of his victim in an argument over a half-crown
outside the Fleece-Taveme. Id. at 776.
15. Id. at 769.
16. Id. at 770-71.
17. Id. at 777.
18. Id.
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absence. 19 Lord Morley was acquitted of murder but was found guilty of
manslaughter and fined.
This case stands for the proposition that where it is
sufficiently shown that the accused's voluntary wrongful act resulted in a
witness's unavailability at trial, the now-unavailable witness's out-of-court
statements will be admitted in evidence against the accused.2'
Some years later, in 1692, Henry Harrison was charged with the "choke and
strangle" murder of Dr. Andrew Clenche.2 2 At trial before the House of Lords,
Barnabas Smith testified that an apprentice, Andrew Bowsell, told him that while
on an errand, a man approached him and asked if he was going to testify against
Harrison. 23 When Bowsell said that he would testify, the man offered him
money, "desiring him to be kind to Mr. Harrison., 24 Richard Tims, Bowsell's
master, testified that three soldiers took Bowsell away later that evening, one
soldier returned the next morning to pick up his clothes, and later attempts to
On this testimony, the court admitted in
locate him were unsuccessful.2
evidence Bowsell's earlier deposition connecting Harrison to the murder.2 6
Relying on the Lord Morley precedent, the House of Lords held that a witness's
out-of-court deposition would be admissible at trial to replace live in-court
testimony of the missing witness if the evidence's proponent "sufficiently"
proved that the accused procured the witness's absence.2
Four years after Harrison's Case, in 1696, the House of Commons
expanded the rule of Lord Morley's Case to the admissibility of testimony from
an earlier trial.28 Sir John Fenwick, a Jacobite, plotted with many others to
restore James II, who lost the throne to William III in the Revolution of 1688.29
"Before the conspirators could carry out their machinations, however, three
members of the group disclosed the plot to [King] William. One by one, [the
members of the group] were arrested, tried, and convicted of treason." Fenwick
knew that only two witnesses could prove his guilt, George Porter and Cardell
Goodman. 31 Under
then-existing law, two witnesses were needed for a high32
treason conviction.
In an effort to subvert this requirement, Fenwick first sent his agent to bribe
Porter to leave for France.3 3 Porter, however, took the money and alerted the
19. Id.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 785-86.
Id.
Harrison's Case, (1692) 12 State Trials 833, 834 (Eng.).
Id. at 851.

24. Id.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 851-52.
Id. at 852-53. Bowsell's deposition was given before the coroner. Id.
Id. at 853.
Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 530 (2000).
Id at 526.
Id. (citations omitted).

31. Id.

32. Id. at 526-27 (referring to "An Act for Regulating of Tryals in Cases of Treason and
Misprision of Treason").
33. Id. at 527.
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authorities.3 4 Having failed with Porter, "Fenwick threw himself on the mercy of
the court and offered to disclose all he knew of the Jacobite plotting" to delay his
trial.35
Meanwhile, Lady Fenwick, his wife, helped Goodman escape.36
Although foul play appeared to be afoot, the court refused to admit Goodman's
prior testimony from the trial of one of Fenwick's co-conspirators against
Fenwick because no evidence could link Lady Fenwick's conduct to her
husband.37 Nevertheless, perhaps because the court still suspected that Lady
Fenwick's cunning actions were in consort with her husband, the House of
Commons passed a bill of attainder against Fenwick, with the Crown's consent,
nullifying the two-witness requirement after reviewing the contents of
Goodman's sworn deposition. 38 On Porter's testimony alone, 39 the court
convicted Lord Fenwick of treason and beheaded him on January 28, 1697.40
The common-law forfeiture doctrine was further refined in Regina v.
Scaife.4 1 Mathew Scaife appealed a larceny conviction after he was tried jointly
with Thomas Rooke and John Smith.42 At trial, the prosecution presented
evidence that Smith bribed Sarah Ann Garnet, a prosecution witness, to prevent
her trial testimony.43 Consequently, the judge allowed her sworn deposition to be
read in open court against Smith. 4 On appeal, the Queen's Bench held that the
jury should have been instructed that the deposition evidence could only be used
against Smith, the party who caused her absence.45 "[I]t ought to have been
applied to the case against him only, and not to the case against the other
prisoners" because there was no evidence that they attempted to procure the
witness's absence.46 Lord Coleridge explained that "if a witness was absent,
either by reason of death of the witness, or by the procurement of the prisoner,
the deposition was receivable in evidence against him. '4 7
The Georgia Supreme Court reached the same result in Williams v. State,48
the first American case to apply the forfeiture doctrine. There, the defendant was
convicted of the larceny of a watch. 49 At trial, the prosecutor suggested that the
34. Id. (citations omitted).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 528. There was extensive discussion about the ex post facto application of the new
statute against Lord Fenwick. The House of Lords declared that Lord Fenwick was "so
inconsiderable a Man, as to the endangering the Peace of the Government" that it justified the
retroactive application of the law. Sir J. Fenwick's Bill of Attainder, (1696) 16 Will. 111 48 (H.L.).
39. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 528 (2000).
40. Id.
41. (1851) 117 Eng. Rep. 1271 (Q.B.).

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 1272.
Id. (discussion by Judge Patteson).
Id.
19 Ga. 402 (1856).
Id.
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accused induced the watch's rightful owner "to absent himself from court," and
consequently the trial judge admitted into evidence the owner's written testimony
to a Magistrate. 50 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court found that there was no
evidence that the accused procured the owner's absence. 51 The evidence only
showed that the accused and the owner had settled their disagreement about
52
As such, the owner's out-of-court deposition was not
ownership of
53 the watch.
admissible.
These cases demonstrate that the common-law forfeiture rule focused
exclusively on the accused's voluntary wrongful conduct in causing the
unavailability of the out-of-court declarant's live in-court testimony.54 This
approach to forfeiture did not require a showing that the accused acted with
intent to prevent the witness from testifying, and it steadfastly preserved the right
of confrontation where there was no causal link between the accused and the
witness's failure to appear at the proceedings. 55 While the early common-law
cases addressed the accused's post-crime conduct, there is nothing in the
forfeiture doctrine's historical development to suggest that it should be limited to
post-crime conduct. We will show that a modem application of the common-law
principle of forfeiture has no temporal or subject-matter limitations. The
constitutional forfeiture doctrine should apply whenever the accused's voluntary
and wrongful conduct causes unavailability, whether pre-crime, post-crime, or
during the very crime for which the accused is on trial.
III. RECOGNITION AND AFFIRMATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE
OF FORFEITURE BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

A.

Reynolds v. United States: Recognition of the Common-Law Equitable
Doctrine of Forfeiture

More than 200 years after Lord Morley's Case, the U.S. Supreme Court, in
Reynolds v. United States,56 first recognized the doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing.57 The case arose in the Territory of Utah, where George Reynolds
was convicted of bigamy based on his marriage to Amelia Jane Schofield while
he was still married to his first wife, Mary Ann Tuddenham. 58 The dispositive
facts begin with a marshal who arrived at the accused's home to serve a subpoena

50. Id.
51. Id. at 403.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1878); Williams, 19 Ga. at 402; Regina v.
Scaife, (1851) 169 Eng. Rep. 505 (Q.B.); Fenwick's Case, (1696) 13 State Trials 538 (Eng.);
Harrison's Case, (1692) 12 State Trials 833 (Eng.); King v. Morley, (1666) 6 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B.).
55. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159.
56. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
57. Flanagan, supra note 12, at 1205.
58. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 146, 148.
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on Amelia Jane Schofield.59 Although the subpoena was issued incorrectly in the
name of Mary Jane Schobold, the marshal knew Amelia Jane Schofield as Mary
Jane Schofield or Mrs. Reynolds. 60 The prosecution also established in court that
Amelia Jane Schofield was living with the accused at the time that the marshal
appeared at their home. 61 The marshal testified that he spoke to the accused, who
claimed that Mary Jane Schofield was not at home and refused to say where she
was. 62 Reynolds also told the marshal that "[Schofield] did not appear in this
case."63
Early on in the trial, the prosecutor discovered the error in misnaming the
witness in the subpoena and issued a new subpoena with her correct name. 64 The
same marshal returned to the accused's home that evening and spoke with his
first wife.65 She told the marshal that the wife named in the subpoena was not
home and had not been there for three weeks.66 The marshal returned the next
morning but had the same result.67 The next day, after holding an evidentiary
hearing, the judge ruled to admit Schofield's sworn testimony from a prior trial
of the accused, on a different charge, in evidence.68
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Reynolds's conviction and
found no constitutional error, since the evidence supported the trial court's
determination that the accused was responsible for Schofield's unavailability at
trial.69 Chief Justice Waite, speaking for the Court, reasoned that the prosecutor
presented "enough" unrebutted evidence to explain the witness's unavailability in
the presence of the accused. 70 "Clearly, enough had been proven to cast the
burden [on Reynolds to show] that he had not been instrumental in concealing or
keeping the witness away."'7' Reynolds did not rebut the prosecution evidence
even though he had an opportunity to explain Schofield's absence from the
trial.72 Chief Justice Waite elaborated:
The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be
confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his own
wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to
supply the place of that which he has kept away. The Constitution does not
guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own
wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 148.
Id.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 160 (1879).
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his
privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied
in some lawful73way, he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have
been violated.

According to Reynolds, the forfeiture rule "has its foundation in the
[equitable] maxim that no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own
wrong, and, consequently, if there has not been ... a wrong committed, the way
has not been opened for the introduction of the testimony. 7 4 The Court noted
that "this long-established usage ... has rarely been departed from" and is an
"outgrowth of a maxim based on the principles of common honesty. 75
What is most striking about the Reynolds constitutional analysis is that it
focused exclusively on the accused's voluntary wrongful conduct and its
consequences. 7 6 The Reynolds Court did not inject an intent element or suggest
that forfeiting confrontation rights depends on the accused's purpose or
motivation in preventing his wife from giving adverse testimony against him at
trial. 77
One confrontation clause scholar, Professor James Flanagan, argues that the
Reynolds Court applied the waiver doctrine, which was later articulated in
Johnson v. Zerbst7 as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege., 79 He maintains that waiver requires a showing that the
accused acted with specific intent to prevent live trial testimony. 80 To support his
position, Professor Flanagan relies on language from Reynolds concluding that
Reynolds had "considered it better to rely upon the weakness of the case made
against him than to attempt to develop the strength of his own. 81 In
extrapolating a waiver rationale, he argues that Reynolds knew that his wife had
testified against him in a previous trial and the prosecutor was seeking her live
testimony.
Professor Flanagan additionally notes that Reynolds refused to
reveal his wife's whereabouts to keep the marshal from serving her with a
subpoena.83 He concludes that the accused's silence in open court after hearing
testimony supports an inference that Reynolds knew where she
the marshal's
84
was.

73. Id. at 158.
74. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id
78. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
79. Flanagan, supra note 12, at 1200.
80. Id.
81. James F. Flanagan, Foreshadowing the Future of Forfeiture/Estoppelby Wrongdoing:
Davis v. Washington and the Necessity of the Defendant'sIntent to Intimidate the Witness, 15 J.L.
& POL'Y 863, 869 (2007).
82. Flanagan, supra note 12, at 1205.
83. Id at 1207.
84. Id. at 1208.
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From these assumptions, Professor Flanagan deduces that Reynolds had
knowingly and intentionally waived his constitutional right to confront his wife
in court.
For validation, Professor Flanagan relies on the Johnson v. Zerbst
waiver test, which "looks to the defendant's knowledge of the right as well as the
deliberate intention to relinquish that right., 86 He concludes that the defendant's
"[k]nowledge of the right of confrontation and the intention to relinquish that
specific right are inferred from the
defendant's intentional act aimed at
87
preventing a witness from testifying."
At first blush, Professor Flanagan makes an appealing argument to support
his waiver claim, but the Reynolds opinion itself does not support his
conclusions. The Reynolds Court did not suggest that the application of
forfeiture hinged on Reynolds's purpose or motivation in keeping his wife from
testifying at the trial.88 Rather, the Court's decision focused exclusively on
Reynolds's voluntary wrongful act of keeping his wife away from trial.8 9 The
triggering event for the forfeiture's application 90
was Reynolds's voluntary and
wrongful act in preventing her in-court testimony.
A fair reading of Reynolds reveals that the accused did not choose to forego
a constitutional right. 91 Reynolds lost his confrontation rights by making his wife
92
unavailable for live testimony; the decision, a judicial ruling, was made for him.
There is no evidence that Reynolds was aware that he had a constitutional right to
confront witnesses against him or that he knowingly and intentionally
relinquished such a right. Rather, Reynolds forfeited his constitutional right, a
form of punishment for his voluntary and wrongful act.93 Additionally, the
English common-law cases that the Reynolds Court relied on did not make intent
an element of the forfeiture analysis. 94 Instead, the "focus was on whether there
was adequate proof that the defendants caused the witnesses' absence. 9 5 This
shifts the analysis away from intent and waiver to voluntary and wrongful
conduct and forfeiture.
Professor Flanagan's suggestion that the Reynolds decision was grounded in
waiver would be correct if there was credible evidence that Reynolds knew,
understood, and appreciated his constitutional right to confrontation; that he had
intended to prevent his wife's in-court testimony; and that he had knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to cross-examine her. No such evidence, however,

85. Id.
86. Id. at 1200.
87. Id. at 1201.
88. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 160 (1879).

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
at 159-60.
See id.
Id. at 159.
Id.

94. People v. Giles (Giles II), 152 P.3d 433, 438 n.3 (Cal. 2007), vacated, Giles v. California
(Giles III), 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).

95. Id.

HeinOnline -- 40 U. Tol. L. Rev. 585 2009

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

is in the Court's opinion. 96 Accordingly, Professor Flanagan's conclusion that
"[t]he constitutional rule stated in Reynolds was that a deliberate intention to
prevent a witness from testifying supports the loss of confrontation as to that
witness" 97 is untenable. Intent has no bearing on the constitutional analysis of
forfeiture by wrongdoing.
Professor Flanagan also argues that courts will be inclined to use the
forfeiture exception to admit untested hearsay in circumstances where witnesses
are merely unwilling to cooperate with the prosecution, notably in domesticviolence cases.98 However, this prediction will not materialize because the
constitutional forfeiture-by-wrongdoing analysis requires proof that voluntary
and wrongful conduct of the accused actually caused the unavailability of the
witness's live testimony. 99
B.

Forfeitureand Waiver: Clarifying the BlurredLine

Waiver and forfeiture are two distinct concepts, yet some courts misapply
waiver in confrontation clause analysis. 10 0 Professor Flanagan posits that
"forfeiture ,,101
by wrongdoing" should actually be termed "estoppel by
wrongdoing,'
a more neutral label that he argues does not immediately assume
the absence of the intent requirement for purposes of the debate. 102 Injecting an
additional label into the mix will only further confound and mystify courts.
Justice Scalia has noted that "although our cases have so often used them
03
interchangeably," waiver and forfeiture concepts "are really not the same.'
Waiver is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege," which can occur either before or during a trial. 10 4 When it comes to
waiver, the accused makes personal choices, such as whether to confess, 10 5 plead
96. See generally Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145.
97. Flanagan, supra note 81, at 869.
98. Id. at 874-75, 893-95.
99. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
100. Id. at 868.
101. Id. at 867.
102. Id.
103. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 894 n.2 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
Accord United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) ("Waiver is different from forfeiture.").
104. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
105. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). The Fifth Amendment commands that "no
person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' Id. at 461
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V). Chief Justice Warren stated that the constitutional rule requires
that the accused be made aware that he or she has the right to remain silent and that any statements
made by the accused must be made voluntarily. Id. at 462. In other words, the accused must not be
"involuntarily impelled to make a statement [by improper police influence], when but for the
improper influences he would have remained silent." Id. The Court established that "[p]rior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. at 444. An accused, however, may always waive his
own constitutional rights, "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."
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guilty, °6 proceed to ajury,'0 7 defend through counsel or personally, 0 8 testify, 1°9
or present a defense." Waiver depends on a showing that the accused knew the
nature of his or her constitutional right and that he or she intentionally
relinquished its protection."' Professor Peter Westen correctly stated that before
the prosecution can assert that the accused has waived a constitutional right, it
has to:
[S]how that he made a deliberate decision to forgo [this right], that he made the
decision after being fully apprised of the consequences and alternatives, and that the

106. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). Justice Douglas explained that a "plea of
guilty ... is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment."
Id. Therefore, the validity of a confession "must be based on a 'reliable determination on the
voluntariness issue which satisfies the constitutional rights of the defendant."' Id. (quoting Jackson
v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 387 (1964)). The record must clearly demonstrate that the accused
"intelligently and understandingly" waived his constitutional protection, and "[a]nything less is not
waiver." Id.
107. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 295 (1930). "The Sixth Amendment provides" that
"[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury." Id. at 288 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI). However, "these protective provisions
of the Constitution are not so imperative that an accused shall be tried by jury when he desires to
plead guilty ... [or in other situations] when he had waived that constitutional right." Id. at 294-95.
An accused must have "intelligently refused such constitutional privilege" for the waiver to be
effective. Id. at 295. The constitutional right to a trial by jury "is not jurisdictional, but was meant
to confer a right upon the accused which he may forego at his election." Id. at 298.
108. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 814 (1975). The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "a
person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of
counsel before he can be validly convicted and punished by imprisonment." Id. at 807. These
rights are granted to the accused "personally" and include the accused's implied right to proceed
pro se in his own defense. Id. at 819. For an accused to represent himself or herself, he or she must
"knowingly and intelligently" waive his or her constitutional rights. Id. at 835 (citing Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938)). The accused should be made aware of the difficulty of
proceeding pro se "so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice
is made with eyes open."' Id. (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279
(1942)).
109. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 582-83 (1961). Justice Brennan explained that there is
"no rational justification for prohibiting the sworn testimony of the accused, who above all others
may be in a position to meet the prosecution's case." Id. at 582.
110. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). The Court explained that "the right of
an accused in a criminal trial to ... a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations" is
essential to due process. Id.
A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard
in his defense-a right to his day in court-are basic in our system of jurisprudence; and
these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer
testimony, and to be represented by counsel.
Id. (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948)).
111. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (stating that a "waiver is ordinarily an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege").
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[prosecution] itself had done nothing to make
a decision to assert his rights more
"costly" than a decision to relinquish them.'1 12
In the end, the accused personally
must make the decision to waive a
3
constitutionally protected right."1
Forfeiture, on the other hand, is the loss of a constitutional right because of
the accused's misconduct.' "4 The right is taken away from the accused as a direct
consequence of his or her wrongful and voluntary conduct, "regardless of the
[accused's] knowledge thereof and irrespective of whether the [accused] intended
to relinquish the right.""' ' It is the "automatic and unintentional loss of a right
upon the happening of a specified condition"' 1 6 and "occurs by operation of law
' 17
without regard to the [accused's] state of mind.""
The significant difference between waiver and forfeiture analysis is that an
accused "can forfeit his [rights] without ever having made a deliberate, informed
decision to relinquish them, and without ever having been in a position to make a
cost-free decision to assert them."'" 8 Ultimately, the trial judge, and not the
accused, makes the final decision to strip the accused of his or her confrontation
rights." 9 Indeed, forfeiting of confrontation rights is the price that the accused
pays as a penalty for having caused the unavailability of the out-of-court
20
declarant's live testimony through his or her voluntary wrongful conduct.'
Conversely, where the witness's unavailability
at trial results from the accused's
2
unintentional act, forfeiture is not justified.' '
Forfeiting confrontation rights is analogous to the "loss" of the accused's
right to be physically present at his or her own trial. In Allen v. Illinois, the
accused, after refusing the services of appointed counsel, began to voir dire the
first juror. 122 After the judge requested that Allen restrict his questions to the
prospective juror's qualifications, Allen began to argue with the judge in an
"abusive and disrespectful manner."' 123 He ended his remarks by telling the judge
that "[w]hen I go out for lunchtime, you're going to be a corpse here." 4 He also

112. Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationalefor the Forfeiture of ConstitutionalRights

in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214, 1214 (1977) (discussing the difference between

waiver and forfeiture of constitutional rights albeit in the context of a guilty plea).
113. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 (noting that Sixth Amendment rights are granted to the
accused "personally").
114. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.3(c), at 546 n.4 (2d

ed. 1992).
115. Id. (explaining that, unlike forfeiture, "waiver" refers to an "intentional relinquishment of a
known right").
116. Flanagan, supra note 81, at 867.
117. Westen, supra note 112, at 1214.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See infra note 173 for examples.
122. 397 U.S. 337, 339 (1970).
123. Id.
124. Jd. at 340.
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tore his standby attorney's file and threw various papers on the floor. 125 The
judge again warned Allen to behave, but he continued to talk back to the judge,
saying that "[t]here's not going to be no trial either. I'm going to sit here and
you're going to talk and you can bring your shackles out and straight jacket and
put them on me and tape my mouth, but it will do no good because there's not
going to be no trial." 26 He made additional abusive remarks, at which time "the
trial judge ordered the trial to proceed"
without the presence of the accused, who
127
was removed from the courtroom.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed Allen's removal.2 8 Speaking
for the Court, Justice Black recognized that "[o]ne of the most basic of the rights
guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused's right to be present in the
courtroom at every stage of his trial. ,1 29 Allen, however, "lost" his right to be
present during the trial proceedings and to confront witnesses against him
because of his disruptive behavior.' 3 Justice Black explained:
[A] defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned by
the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he
nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and
disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the
courtroom.
In upholding Allen's removal from the trial proceedings, Justice Black did
not invoke the waiver doctrine but instead focused on the accused's voluntary
disruptive conduct.' 32 Allen paid a price for his voluntary wrongful conduct; he
forfeited his right to be present during the court proceedings. 33 It naturally
follows that an accused who renders a witness unavailable for live testimony at
trial through voluntary wrongful conduct should be subject to a similar loss of
constitutional rights via forfeiture.
C.

Crawford v. Washington and Davis v. Washington: Affirming the
Common-Law Equitable ForfeitureDoctrine

The Reynolds forfeiture analysis, which we have shown did not include an
intent element, was affirmed in dicta in Crawford v. Washington'34 and Davis v.
Washington. 35 In Crawford, Justice Scalia wrote that "the rule of forfeiture by
wrongdoing ... extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 343.
Id at 338 (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892)).
Id. at 343.
Id.
Allen v. Illinois, 397 U.S. 337, 346 (1970).

Id.
541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
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grounds.' ' 136 He did not say that the accused waives confrontation rights by his or
her wrongdoing. Likewise in Davis, Justice Scalia reiterated the Crawford
dictum and added that "one who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing
forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation.', 137 He noted that:
[W]hen defendants seek to undermine the judicial process by procuring or coercing
silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment does not require courts to
acquiesce. While defendants have no duty to assist the State in proving their guilt,
they do have the duty to
refrain from acting in ways that destroy the integrity of the
38
criminal-trial system.1

Justice Scalia's focus on the accused's voluntary wrongful conduct once again
supports a forfeiture analysis that implicitly rejects intent as an element and, with
it, the waiver principle. 139
Professor Flanagan argues that the dicta in Crawford and Davis support his
view that the Supreme Court adopted an estoppel- or waiver-by-wrongdoing
standard. 40 He acknowledges that the Court "did not explicitly hold that intent
was required, but ...it came as close to that conclusion as possible.' 141 He
concludes "[t]he words, and the Court's discussion, are inconsistent with any
theory that the defendant's intent is irrelevant or that merely being the proximate
cause of the witness' unavailability is sufficient grounds to support the loss of
confrontation rights.' 4 2 He argues that Justice Scalia's use of the phrase
"procuring or coercing the silence from witnesses" 143 in Davis necessarily
implies intent because "coercing"
and "procuring" are "purposeful acts" intended
144
to achieve an objective.
We disagree. Standing alone, the words "procuring or coercing the silence
from witnesses" do not include or convey an intent element. 45 These words can
and do support a contrary conclusion that pins the focus on the consequence of
the accused's voluntary and wrongful conduct that renders the live testimony
unavailable. Since Justice Scalia did not explicitly inject an intent element in his
articulation, it would be wrong to argue that he did so implicitly.
Although Justice Scalia recognized in Davis that Rule 804(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), which contains a statutory intent element,
codifies the forfeiture doctrine, he did not say that FRE 804(b)(6) codifies the
constitutional doctrine of waiver by wrongdoing. 46 The Davis articulation of
forfeiture under the Sixth Amendment was not tied to the elements of FRE
136. Crawford,541 U.S. at 62.
137. Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.

138. Id.
139. Id
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Flanagan, supra note 81, at 886.
Id.
Id.at 881.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.
Flanagan, supra note 81, at 880-8 1.
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
Id.at 833-34.
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804(b)(6). 147 Justice Scalia's use of the word "forfeiture"' 148 referred to the
Reynolds Court's opinion that "one who obtains the absence of a witness by
wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional right to confrontation."' 149 It is therefore
reasonable to conclude that Justice Scalia purposely used the word "forfeiture,"
and not "waiver," to affirm the equitable forfeiture doctrine first developed in
English and early American common-law cases to create a constitutional
measure.
The language in question is precise. Thus, a reasonable reading of
Reynolds, Crawford, and Davis leads to the conclusion that the constitutional
analysis under the Sixth Amendment should focus exclusively on the accused's
wrongful and voluntary conduct that actually prevents live trial testimony,
without reference to the accused's intention or motivation.
IV. POST CRA WFORD-DA VIS; INTENT OR NO INTENT:

CONFLICTING APPLICATIONS OF THE FORFEITURE DOCTRINE

A.

People v. Giles: Intent Not Required

After Crawford and Davis, jurisdictions have split as to whether intent to
procure unavailability is an element in the analysis of the equitable forfeiture
doctrine of the Sixth Amendment. 150 California holds that it is not. 151 In People
v. Giles, 52 the defendant appealed his first-degree murder conviction, arguing
statements to police officers
that the trial court improperly admitted the victim's
53
regarding an earlier domestic-violence incident. 1
A few weeks before the murder, police officers investigated a domestic
violence report between the defendant and the murder victim.' 5 The victim told
the officers that the defendant had accused her of having an affair with her friend,55
beat her, and told her that he would kill her if he caught her cheating on him.
147. See id. at 833.
148. Id.; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
149. Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.
150. Compare State v. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, 57, 299 Wisc. 2d 267, 57, 727 N.W.2d 518, 57
(adopting the "broad forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine" allowing the state to show by "a
preponderance of the evidence that the accused caused the absence of the witness"), with People v.
Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333, 349 (Ill. 2007) ("The statement that the accused forfeits his confrontation
rights when he 'voluntarily' keeps the witnesses away is a clear expression of intent.").
151. People v. Giles (Giles 11), 152 P.3d 433, 434 (Cal. 2007), vacated, Giles v. California
(Giles 111), 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
152. Id. at 433.
153. Id. at 437. The defendant was romantically involved with the victim, Brenda Avie, for
several years, but was also seeing another woman. Id. at 435. Avie arrived at the house where the
defendant was staying and had a conversation with him in a normal conversational tone. Id. at 436.
"Avie then yelled 'Granny' several times," followed by a series of gunshots. Id. When people
inside the house ran outside, they discovered the "defendant holding a nine millimeter handgun and
standing about 11 feet from Avie," who was shot six times in the torso and bleeding on the ground.
Id. "Avie was not carrying a weapon when she was shot." Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 436-37.
HeinOnline -- 40 U. Tol. L. Rev. 591 2009

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Over the defendant's objection, the trial court admitted the victim's hearsay
statement to the officers'
6 and the jury subsequently convicted the defendant of
57
first-degree murder.'
On review, the California Supreme Court observed that Crawford changed
the admissibility standard for testimonial statements,158 and there was no dispute
that the victim's statements to the police officers were testimonial. 59 The
question before the court was whether the statements were nonetheless
properly
60
admitted under the forfeiture exception to the Confrontation Clause.
In deciding whether the forfeiture exception was applicable, the California
Supreme Court observed that English and early American common-law cases
that developed the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing "did not suggest that the
rule's applicability hinged on [the accused's] purpose or motivation in
committing the wrongful act."' 16 1 It concluded that only a voluntary and wrongful
act is required. 162 The court noted that following Reynolds, the development of
the equitable doctrine of "forfeiture by wrongdoing" was largely insignificant,
and it was not until the 1960s and 1970s that lower federal courts began to apply
the doctrine in witness-tampering cases where the defendant either murdered or
was responsible for the murder of a witness. 163 The Giles court found that the
federal courts employed this doctrine "where the defendant, by a wrongful act,
was involved in or responsible for procuring the unavailability of a hearsay
declarant, and did so, at least in part, with the intention of making the declarant
unavailable as an actual or potential witness against the defendant."'' 64 The court
observed that after the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford accepted the equitable
forfeiture doctrine, many courts altered their views and began to "focus on the
equitable forfeiture rationale" as a means for admitting
hearsay testimony
65
without proof of witness tampering in homicide cases.'
The Giles court rejected the accused's claims that intent is an essential
element and that the constitutional analysis "is, in essence, not based on broad
forfeiture principles, but instead on waiver principles."' 66 The court found
support for its position in the Crawford "forfeiture" formulation as a principle
that "'extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds,' not a
156. Id at 437.
157.

Id.

158. See id.
159. Id at 438.
160. See People v. Giles (Giles 11), 152 P.3d 433, 435 (Cal. 2008), vacated, Giles v. California
(Giles 111), 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
161. ld at438n.3.
162. See id. at 443.
163. Id. at 439.
164. Id. (citing United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 653-54 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 925-27 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279-80
(1st Cir. 1996); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1198-99, 1202 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 628-29 (10th Cir.
1979)).
165. Id. at 440.
166. Id. at442.
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waiver."' 67 The equitable basis for the doctrine "strongly16 8suggests that the rule's
applicability does not hinge on the wrongdoer's motive."
The California Supreme Court rejected the view that some federal courts
articulated before Crawford,concluding that "it appears that the intent-to-silence
element required by some cases evolved from the erroneous characterization of
the forfeiture doctrine as the waiver by misconduct doctrine."' 169 The Giles court
reasoned that the forfeiture principles "can and should logically and equitably be
extended to other types of cases in which an intent-to-silence element is
missing."' 7 ° It explained that forfeiture of a constitutional right "is a logical
extension of the equitable principle that no person should benefit from his own
wrongful acts."''
Where the accused through his "intentional criminal act"
renders a witness unavailable for trial, he would improperly "benefit[] from his
crime if he [could] use the witness's unavailability to exclude damaging hearsay
statements by the witness that would otherwise be admissible."' 7 2
This conclusion does not depend on "whether or not the defendant
specifically intended to prevent the witness from testifying at the time he
committed the act that rendered the witness unavailable."' 17 3 The California
Supreme Court held that post-Crawford decisions, including that of the court of
appeals in this case, "have correctly applied the forfeiture doctrine in a necessary,
equitable manner." 74 Equity allows courts to "further the truth-seeking functions
of the adversary process when necessary, allowing fact finders access to relevant
' 75
evidence that the defendant caused not to be available through live testimony."'
Other jurisdictions have applied the same forfeiture analysis that the court
expressed in Giles.176 These courts have similarly eliminated intent where the
accused's voluntary and wrongful conduct resulted in the out-of-court declarant's

167. Id. at 439 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 443.
170. People v. Giles (Giles 11), 152 P.3d 433, 443 (Cal. 2008), vacated, Giles v. California
(Giles 111), 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The Court of Appeals also noted that "a defendant can only be deemed to have
forfeited his right of confrontation through an intentional criminal act." People v. Giles (Giles I),
123 Cal. App. 4th 475, 487 (Ct. App. 2004), aff'd in part, superseded in part by Giles I, 152 P.3d
at 433. "[I]t
is not enough to commit some act that incidentally produces that result." For example,
where a witness "was killed because [defendant] intentionally fired a gun at her; it is perfectly
appropriate to conclude that in doing so, [defendant] forfeited his right to confront her in the event
her hearsay statements were offered as evidence in some future criminal prosecution." Id.
Contrarily, if a witness "had instead been killed in an unintentional automobile collision while
[defendant] was driving, he would have been the technical cause of her unavailability at any future
trial, but his actions could not be construed as a forfeiture of his right to confront her as a witness."
Id.
174. Giles I, 152 P.3d at 444.
175. Id.
176. Id.
HeinOnline -- 40 U. Tol. L. Rev. 593 2009

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 40

unavailability to the prosecution.' 77 For example, in State v. Sanchez, 178 the
accused shot and killed the victim.' 79 Over his objection, the trial court admitted
a note in which the victim wrote that the accused threatened to kill her if he ever
caught her cheating on him. 80 The accused appealed his jury conviction of
deliberate homicide, arguing that the trial court had violated his confrontation
rights by admitting the note.1 81 He asserted that the note was inadmissible
2
because he was unable to cross-examine her about the contents of her note. 18
The Montana Supreme Court agreed that the victim's note was
testimonial, 83 but it determined that the accused lost his confrontation right
under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.' 84 The court declined to adopt
Giles in its entirety and qualified its holding as not "amount[ing] to a 'broad
' 85
sweeping statement' as to the applicability of the forfeiture doctrine,"'
reasoning that "[t]o the extent that a deliberate criminal act results in the victim's
177. Courts applying the Sixth Amendment equitable forfeiture doctrine have made clear that
the doctrine can be applied where no formal charges have been filed against the would-be
defendant and no adverse witnesses have been designated. All that is required is that there is a
possibility that an individual could be called as a witness if formal charges were brought against the
would-be defendant. See United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2005) (explaining that
the forfeiture doctrine "does not require that the declarant would otherwise be a witness at any
particulartrial"); United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying the forfeiture
doctrine "where 'there was [no] ongoing proceeding in which the declarant was scheduled to
testify' ... [because to do otherwise] 'would serve as a prod to the unscrupulous to accelerate the
timetable and murder suspected snitches sooner rather than later') (internal quotations omitted));
United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921, 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (concluding that "the right of
confrontation is forfeited with respect to any witness or potential witness whose absence a
defendant wrongfully procures"); United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 668 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating
that the forfeiture doctrine should not be limited to situations where there is "an ongoing
proceeding in which the declarant was scheduled to testify"); United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d
1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 1996) (explaining that the forfeiture doctrine can be applied when it is
"reasonably foreseeable that the investigation will culminate in the bringing of charges, the mere
fact that the homicide occurs at an earlier step in the pavane should not affect the operation of the
waiver-by-misconduct doctrine"); Steele v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1982) (affirming
application of the forfeiture doctrine to a signed statement given to FBI agents by a potential
witness).
178. 177 P.3d 444 (Mont. 2008).
179. Id. at 447.
180. Id. The accused testified that he became suspicious that the victim, his then girlfriend, was
cheating on him. Id. He confronted her and confirmed his suspicions. Id. In a later conversation,
the victim also threatened to create problems for him with the police so that his children would be
taken away from him. Id. According to the accused, he became enraged and shot the victim
several times. Id.
181. People v. Giles (Giles 11), 152 P.3d 433, 451 (Cal. 2008), vacated, Giles v. California
(Giles 111), 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
182. Sanchez, 177 P.3d at 447.
183. Id. at 452-53. The Court observed that the note's substance was to explain the victim's
untimely death or poisoning. Id. The note named the person she suspected would kill her and the
method that he would use. Id. "In essence, Aleasha's note contained information that could
establish or prove facts to answer questions regarding how, why, and by whom she had been
harmed or killed." Id.
184. Id. at 456.
185. Id. at456n.3.
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death ... the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine does not hinge on whether the
defendant specifically intended to silence a witness."' 86 In the spirit of Giles, the
Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that the forfeiture doctrine is based1 87on
"the maxim that no person should benefit from [his or her] own wrongdoing."
By its very nature, the out-of-court declarant's murder always results in the
unavailability of his or her adverse trial testimony.' 88 For this reason, the
accused who commits murder should not be allowed to exclude the victimdeclarant's out-of-court statements "regardless of whether the defendant
specifically intended to silence the victim-declarant."'' 89
To deny the
admissibility of these statements would "undermine[] the judicial process and
threaten[] the integrity of court proceedings."' 90 In applying the forfeiture
doctrine in this case, the Montana Supreme Court held that "when a defendant
admittedly and deliberately kills another person, thus procuring the person's
unavailability as a witness, the defendant forfeits the constitutional rights to
confront the victim at trial."' 9'
Another case on point is State v. Jensen.'92 There, the accused was charged
with first-degree intentional homicide for his wife's death. 193 At a preliminary
hearing, a witness testified that the victim gave him an envelope and told him to
mail it to the police if anything were to happen to her because she was scared that
her husband was trying to poison her.' 94 A police detective testified that he
received the envelope shortly after the victim was found dead, and that it
contained a letter from her stating that she was afraid that her husband was trying
to kill her and she would never commit suicide. 195 The defendant challenged the
admissibility of the letter and the oral96statements she allegedly made to the
witness in light of Crawford and Davis.'
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the trial court's ruling
that the victim's letter and her other out-of-court statements were inadmissible.
In response to the State's forfeiture-by-wrongdoing argument, the court noted
that Crawford accepted the equitable doctrine of forfeiture in its discussion of
Reynolds and early English precedent.1 98 In fashioning a broad forfeiture-bywrongdoing doctrine that does not include an intent requirement, the court

186. Id. at 456.
187. Id. (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1879)).
188. State v. Sanchez, 177 P.3d 444, 456 (Mont. 2008).

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id.
Id.
2007 WI 26, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518.
Id. 3.

194. Id. 5.
195. Id. 7.

196. Id. 2.
197. Id. 30.
198. Id. 36-38.
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99
recognized that the post-Crawford holding in United States v. Garcia-Meza
2
00
The Jensen court relied on Garcia-Meza's
was very persuasive to its analysis.
explanations: (1) while the FRE contain an element of intent, Sixth Amendment
rights are not governed by "'the vagaries of the Rules of Evidence,"' and (2) the
U.S. "Supreme Court's recent affirmation of the 'essentially equitable grounds'
for the rule of forfeiture strongly suggests that the rule's applicability does not
hinge on the wrongdoer's motive."' 20 The court concluded that forfeiture can be
established by showing that the accused voluntarily committed the wrongful act
that rendered the witness's live in-court testimony unavailable. 20 2 Unlike
Sanchez, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not limit its holding to homicides.20 3
Finally, in State v. Meeks,2 °4 the Kansas Supreme Court considered a
situation in which the accused shot his victim after a fist fight. 20 5 Approximately
ten minutes after the shooting, a police officer arrived on the scene and asked the

victim who shot him.20 6 The victim replied, "Meeks shot me.

' 20 7

One hour later,

died. 20 8

A jury convicted Meeks of first-degree premeditated murder,
the victim
and he received a life sentence without eligibility of parole for twenty-five
years.20 9
On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the accused forfeited his
right to confrontation when he murdered the victim who served as a witness
against him. 210 The court observed that the majority of cases analyzing the
forfeiture doctrine focused on post-crime conduct that rendered the witness
unavailable to testify at trial about the details of the underlying crime.2 11 The
court went on to reject any subject-matter limitations on the application of
forfeiture where, as here, the accused was charged with murder, the very act that

199. 403 F.3d 364, 370-71 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that for purposes of the doctrine of forfeiture
by wrongdoing it was not necessary that Garcia-Meza murdered his wife with the intent of
preventing her testimony).
200. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, 49.
201. Id. 50 (quoting Garcia-Meza,403 F.3d at 370-71).
202. State v. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, 51, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 51, 727 N.W.2d 518, 51.
203. Id.
204. 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004), overruled in part on other grounds in State v. Davis, 158 P.3d

317, 322 (Kan. 2006). Meeks came to a party and demanded that Green apologize for accidentally
shutting Meeks's hand in the door earlier in the day. Id. at 791. When Green refused to apologize,
Meeks challenged Green to a fight outside. Id. After fighting for about five minutes, Green
stopped and walked toward the house. Id. Meeks pulled out a handgun and began to chase Green
around one of the cars parked on the street. Id. At this point, all of the observers ran back into the
house to hide. Id. Wright, one of the people inside the house, saw Green slip and fall. Id. Shortly
thereafter, Wright heard two gunshots and he went outside, finding Green lying on the ground with
Meeks standing in front of him, gun in hand. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 792.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 793-94.
211. Id. at 794.
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caused the witness's unavailability.21 2 Indeed, the idea that the accused forfeits
his or her right of confrontation in murdering the out-of-court declarant finds
support in what Professor Richard Friedman calls the "reflexive" application of
the forfeiture doctrine. 213 In applying forfeiture reflexively in homicide cases,
courts do not require a finding that the accused intended the victim to be unable
to testify at trial. 1
The Meeks court accepted Crawford's formulation of forfeiture by
wrongdoing as a rule that "extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially
equitable grounds., 215 It recognized that Crawford, in turn, relied on the
Reynolds Court's pronouncement that if the accused "voluntarily keeps witnesses
away, he cannot insist on his privilege." 2'16 Here, the declarant's murder kept him
Having wrongfully caused the victim's
from giving live testimony at trial.
unavailability, the Meeks court held that the accused forfeited his right to
confront the out-of-court declarant and, afortiori,to any hearsay objection to the
victim's out-of-court statements.218
212. Id.
213. Reflexive application of the forfeiture doctrine occurs when the accused is on trial for the
out-of-court declarant's murder, and the primary reason why the victim cannot testify at trial is that
the accused murdered her. See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa,
31 ISR. L. REv. 506, 506, 508 (1997). See also Brief of Law Professors Sherman J. Clark et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410),
2003 WL 21754958, at *24 n.16 (1997) (arguing that an "accused should be deemed to have
forfeited the confrontation right, even though the act with which the accused is charged is the same
as the one by which he allegedly rendered the witness unavailable"). The classic illustration of
chutzpa is "the man who kills both his parents and then begs the sentencing court to have mercy on
an orphan." Friedman, supra, at 506. Professor Friedman argues that at the defendant's murder
trial, the only way to prevent the defendant from benefiting from his wrongful act of murdering his
parents is to apply the forfeiture doctrine reflexively. See id. at 517. Professor Friedman also
argued in his Amicus Brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in Crawfordthat:
If the trial court determines as a threshold matter that the reason the victim cannot testify at
trial is that the accused murdered her, then the accused should be deemed to have forfeited the
confrontation right, even though the act with which the accused is charged is the same as the
one by which he allegedly rendered the witness unavailable.
Brief for Law Professors Sherman J.Clark et al., supra, at *24 n. 16.
214. Any act of homicide can trigger reflexive application of the forfeiture doctrine under
Professor Friedman's formulation. See Friedman, supra note 213, at 508. We would limit the
forfeiture doctrine to instances where the accused causes the unavailability by his or her wrongful
and voluntary acts. For example, an act of homicide in the nature of involuntary murder would not
trigger the application of the forfeiture doctrine.
215. State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789, 794 (Kan. 2004) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62), overruled
in part on other grounds in State v. Davis, 158 P.3d 317, 322 (Kan. 2006).
216. Id (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879)). Accord People v. Moore,
117 P.3d 1, 5 (Co. Ct. App. 2004) (applying the equitable-forfeiture doctrine reflexively to hold
that a defendant must not "benefit from his or her wrongful prevention of future testimony from a
witness, regardless whether that witness is the victim in the case").
217. Meeks, 88 P.3d at 792-93.
218. Id. at 795. Accord People v. Bauder, 712 N.W.2d 506, 514 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (holding
that the test for forfeiture is whether the out-of-court declarant is unavailable as a direct result of
some wrongful voluntary act of the defendant regardless of intent).
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Following Crawford, several federal courts of appeals also embraced a
forfeiture analysis that does not include an intent element. In United States v.
2 19 the defendant was convicted of his wife's first-degree murder.22 °
Garcia-Meza,
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, he argued
that the trial court violated his confrontation rights by allowing hearsay evidence
of what his wife told investigating officers after an earlier assault.221 He
contended that for the prosecution to prevail on its forfeiture claim, it had to
prove that he killed or otherwise prevented his wife from testifying with the
intent to prevent her testimony.222
The court, however, found that "[t]here is no requirement that a defendant
who prevents a witness from testifying against him through his own wrongdoing
only forfeits his right to confront the witness where, in procuring the witness's
unavailability, he intended to prevent the witness from testifying." 223 It
distinguished between a constitutional and evidentiary analysis, recognizing that
"[alt]hough the Federal Rules of Evidence [804(b)(6)] may contain [an intent]
requirement, the right secured by the Sixth Amendment does not depend on ...
'the vagaries of the Rules of Evidence."' 224 The court reasoned that the
Crawford affirmation of the forfeiture doctrine's equitable foundation "strongly
suggests that the rule's applicability does not hinge on the wrongdoer's
motive. ,,225 It concluded that the accused forfeits his confrontation rights
"regardless of whether he intended to prevent the witness from testifying against
226
him or not.,
Just four months later, in United States v. Mayhew, 227 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio cited Garcia-Meza in a ruling on
a defendant's motion in limine to exclude an inculpatory audiotape
recording.228
229
The defendant kidnapped and fatally wounded his daughter.
On the way to the

219. 403 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2005).
220. Id. at 365-66. The defendant and his wife, Kathleen, began physically fighting after she
danced with a male friend at a party. Id. at 366. After the fight ended, she went with some family
members to a friend's house to avoid going home that evening. Id. The defendant broke into the
house, and when his wife refused to come with him, he plunged a steak knife into her chest. Id. at
367. The prosecution was allowed to use the testimony of investigating police officers who
responded to a domestic violence dispute between the defendant and his wife several months prior
to the murder. Id. at 367-68.
221. Id. at 369.
222. Id. at 370.
223. Id.
224. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (internal citations omitted)).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. 380 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Ohio 2005).
228. Id. at 963.
229. Id. The defendant broke into the home of his ex-girlfriend and her fiance, shot and killed
them both, and kidnapped his and his ex-girlfriend's daughter. Id. When the defendant, still with
his daughter, was pulled over for a minor traffic offense, he shot the officer as the officer was
approaching the car. Id. After a thirty-minute car chase, the defendant was stopped by a roadblock
and tire spikes. Id. When the police ordered him to exit the car, the defendant shot his daughter
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hospital, his daughter said that the defendant killed her mother (his ex-girlfriend)
and her mother's fianc6, and that he kidnapped her. 230 An officer recorded this
conversation on an audiotape 23'
Despite finding that the statements were testimonial, 232 the court admitted
them because the accused forfeited his confrontation rights by his own
wrongdoing. 233 Citing Garcia-Meza, the court agreed that where the defendant,
through his voluntary wrongful act, rendered unavailable a witness against him,
"the motive behind his wrongdoing was irrelevant." 234 The forfeiture doctrine's
equitable considerations "demand that a defendant forfeits his Confrontation
Clause rights if the court determines ... that the declarant is unable to testify
because the defendant intentionally murdered her., 235 All that matters is that the
defendant rendered the unavailability of live trial testimony through his or her
own voluntary wrongful conduct, regardless of the underlying motivation. 6
B.

People v. Stechly: Intent Is Required

There are some courts that have gone the other way and mistakenly injected
an intent element into the constitutional forfeiture analysis. One example is the
Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Stechly. 237 In that case, the defendant
appealed his convictions of predatory criminal sexual assault, criminal assault,
and aggravated criminal sexual abuse of a five-year-old child.238 He argued that
the trial court erred in admitting the child-victim's out-of-court statements in
violation of his constitutional right to confront her. 239 The trial court admitted the
child's out-of-court statements after holding a pre-trial hearing. 240 During the
hearing, the prosecution presented evidence that, after sexually abusing the childtwice and then shot himself once in the chest. Id. The daughter was taken to a nearby hospital and
died shortly thereafter. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 965 (citing United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004)).
233. Id. at 965-66 (accepting, after an extensive discussion, a reflexive application of the
forfeiture doctrine).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 968. In the authors' opinion, by adopting a reflexive approach to the forfeiture
doctrine, the court stopped short of imputing intent to commit the underlying crime to intent to
render the declarant unavailable.
236. Id.
237. 870 N.E.2d 333 (2007).
238. Id. at 344.
239. Id. at 344-45.
240. Prior to trial, on motion of the State, the court held an availability hearing to determine
whether the child-victim, M.M., was available to testify at trial. Id. at 340. Before the hearing,
M.M. was interviewed by a clinical child psychologist. Id. In the interview, M.M. indicated that
she did not want to talk about the abuse and expressed an unwillingness to testify at trial. Id. The
psychologist testified that her professional opinion was that it would not be in M.M.'s best interests
to force her to testify because she would likely suffer psychological trauma. Id. After hearing this
testimony, the trial court concluded that M.M. was unavailable to testify and admitted her hearsay
statements into evidence. Id. at 341. The defendant was found guilty on all counts. Id. at 344.
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victim, the defendant told her that he would "hurt" her if she told her mother
about the incident.24 1
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant argued that admitting
the victim's hearsay statements violated his rights under the Confrontation
Clause.24 2 The State answered that under the equitable doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing, he should not be allowed to raise his constitutional claim because
his own actions rendered the victim unavailable for trial.243 Writing for the
plurality, Justice Freeman relied on Davis v. Washington244 to hold that intent to
render unavailable is an essential element in the application of the forfeiture
rule.24 5 Specifically, he pointed to language in Davis that the equitable doctrine
of forfeiture applies when the accused "'seek[s] to undermine the judicial process
... or destroy the integrity of the criminal trial system.' 246 He concluded that
"[i]t is, after all, impossible to deter
assault by itself is not enough2 47 because
' 248
those who do not act intentionally."
The Stechly plurality linked the constitutional equitable doctrine of
forfeiture to FRE 804(b)(6), forfeiture by wrongdoing, which does require
intent.249 While recognizing that FRE 804(b)(6) does not have the authority of a
constitutional rule,25° the court acknowledged that some courts have found that
intent is not a required element in a constitutional analysis. 251 Nonetheless, the
plurality concluded that these cases were limited to situations where the accused
actually murdered the victim. 2 52 In instances other than murder, the court held

proof of intent to render a witness unavailable is a necessary element.253 The
prosecution argued that the accused demonstrated his intent to procure the childvictim's unavailability when he told her that he would hurt her if she told anyone
of the incident, but the court ultimately was not willing to make such a factual

241. Id. at 339. Joan, the child-victim's mother, testified that her daughter's babysitter came to
her work and informed her that her daughter, M.M., needed to go to the hospital but did not tell her
why. Id. On the way to the hospital, Joan asked her daughter what was wrong. Id. M.M.

recounted an incident of sexual abuse by "Bob." Id. Joan understood that M.M. was referring to
Joan's boyfriend. Id. Joan testified that the defendant babysat M.M. prior to Christmas 1998, but

when Joan returned, M.M. was "acting peculiar." Id. Joan suspected that the defendant or M.M.'s
father had sexually abused the child. ld. She had confronted the defendant, who denied doing
anything to the child. Id. On arrival at the hospital, a specialist for the hospital's child abuse team

interviewed M.M regarding the incident. Id. In the interview, M.M. told her of sexual abuse by

Bob and that Bob told her he "would be mad" if she told her mother of the incident. Id.
242. Id. at 344-45.
243. Id. at 348.
244. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
245. People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333, 350 (Il. 2007).
246. Id. (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 833).

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
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determination on its own. 254 As a result, the court remanded the inquiry to the
trial court to determine whether255 the defendant forfeited his confrontation
objection by his own wrongdoing.
Chief Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that in light of the overwhelming
evidence supporting the defendant's convictions, it was unnecessary to address
the issue of forfeiture by wrongdoing.2 56 Assuming arguendo that the forfeiture
question needed to be addressed, he disagreed with the way the plurality applied
the doctrine.257 Thomas asserted that the inquiry should not focus on the
accused's intent. 258 Instead, he argued that the accused should not profit from his
own wrongdoing, regardless of motive or intent. 259 The true purpose behind the
common-law doctrine of forfeiture, he explained, is broader than the rationale of
deterring intentional acts,26 ° and it "should not be confused with the federal
statutory hearsay exception, which does have the limited purpose of addressing
witness intimidation. ,26 Thomas declared that in contrast to FRE 804(b)(6), "the
common law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing has a broader grasp" and
operates under equitable principles, as the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in
Crawford.262 He explained that there is no distinction between the out-of-court
declarant-victim's murder or assault for the application of forfeiture.2 63 There
only needs to be a "direct causal connection
between the [accused's] wrongdoing
264
... and the [declarant's] unavailability."

In State v. Romero, 265 the New Mexico Supreme Court applied a forfeiture
analysis similar to the Illinois Supreme Court, and it too was met with a strong
dissent.266 The defendant in that case was convicted of domestic violence and his
estranged wife's second-degree murder.267 On appeal to the New Mexico
Supreme Court, he argued that the trial court erred in admitting testimonial
hearsay evidence in violation of his right to confront adverse witnesses against
him.26 The court analyzed the hearsay statements in light of Crawford and
Davis, determined that the statements were testimonial, and concluded that they
were improperly admitted.2 69 The prosecution argued that even if the statements
did qualify as testimonial, the accused should nonetheless be precluded from
254. Id.
255. People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333, 353 (Ill. 2007).

256. Id. at 382 (Thomas, C.J., dissenting).
257. Id.

258. Id.
259. Id. at 383.
260. See id. Chief Justice Thomas responded to the plurality, stating that it is "after all,
impossible to deter those who do not act intentionally." Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 382.
264. Id. at 389.
265. 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. 2007).

266. Id. at 702.
267. Id. at 696.

268. Id. at 697.
269. Id. at 697-99.
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raising a confrontation clause claim because he forfeited the right by
wrongdoing. 270 The court resolved in the accused's favor, finding that intent to
prevent live testimony is an essential element of the forfeiture doctrine. 27'
The New Mexico Supreme Court observed that "some courts have
considered distinct" the elements of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the
requirements of the U.S. Constitution, 272 noting that some commentators even
suggest that the forfeiture rule applies "whenever a defendant's wrongdoing
caused a witness's unavailability," regardless of a specific intent to render the
witness unavailable.2 73 Nonetheless, the court held that, despite the strong
rationale and public policy against allowing an accused to profit from his or her
own wrongdoing, "emphasis must be not only on wrongdoing but on intentional
wrongdoing, from which an inference of waiver might be appropriate or in which
an equitable conclusion of forfeiture is justified., 27 It concluded that a rule that
requires proof that the accused intended to prevent a witness from testifying
should not be abandoned "in cases where it helps provide a strong basis for
finding waiver or forfeiture. '2 75
In his dissent, Justice Bosson contended that the majority applied the
forfeiture doctrine too narrowly.276 He argued that the accused forfeited the right
to confront his wife when he killed her.277 Justice Bosson reasoned that
regardless of whether the accused procured the absence "with the specific intent
to prevent his wife from testifying, or whether he caused that absence simply in a
drunken rage, the effect is the same. 278 The witness is unavailable to testify.279
It "seems a perversion of the Constitution and the Confrontation Clause to allow
any defendant to profit so from his own misdeeds., 280 Referring to Giles and
Jensen, Justice Bosson complained that the majority was overly limiting when28it1
required "an intent not just to kill the witness, but to silence her as well"
without accounting for the "sweeping changes to the Confrontation Clause
analysis" brought about by the Crawford decision.282
We recognize that the constitutional right of confrontation must be
protected, but this right is not absolute. Forfeiture by wrongdoing terminates the
right because the accused should not be allowed to benefit from his or her own
voluntary and wrongful conduct. Consequently, a voluntary wrongful act that
prevents a witness's live in-court testimony, regardless of motive or purpose,
270. Id. at 701.
271. Id. at 703.
272. Id. at 701.
273. Id. (citing Joshua Deahl, Expanding Forfeiture without Sacrificing Confrontation after
Crawford, 104 MICH. L. REv. 559, 602 (2005)).
274. Id. at 702.
275. State v. Romero, 156 P.3d 694, 702 (N.M. 2007).
276. Id. at 703 (Bosson, J., dissenting).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 704.
282. Id.at 703.
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should result in a loss of the right so as to allow the use of relevant out-of-court
statements in evidence. To hold otherwise would give a windfall to the accused.
The California Supreme Court in Giles and other courts have identified and
formulated the correct standard for Sixth Amendment forfeiture analysis. Unlike
the doctrine of waiver, as articulated by Johnson v. Zerbst where an accused may
knowingly and intelligently forego a constitutional right, 2 93 the equitable doctrine
of forfeiture by wrongdoing does not include an intent element. The Giles line of
cases properly utilizes the forfeiture doctrine as a tool to deliver judicial
punishment to the accused when the prosecution proves that he or she caused the
unavailability of the live in-court testimony of the out-of-court declarant by his or
her voluntary and wrongful act.
V. GILES v. CALIFORNIA: A MISGUIDED DEPARTURE
284
On June 25, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Giles v. California,
addressing the question "whether a defendant forfeits his Sixth Amendment right
to confront a witness against him when a judge determines that a wrongful act by
the defendant made the witness unavailable ...at trial. '2 85 Justice Scalia,
speaking for the plurality, and in a surprising departure from his previous
articulation of forfeiture in Crawford and Davis, held that a forfeiture exception

without an intent element did not exist at the nation's founding.2 86 To support his
new view of the Sixth Amendment's historical underpinnings, Justice Scalia
painstakingly looked to the language in a number of common-law cases,
treatises, and dictionaries.287
While Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Souter, and
Ginsburg 288 generally concurred with his historical analysis, the plurality was
divided on how to apply the exception to the facts of this particular case. 2 9 For
instance, Justices Thomas and Alito questioned whether the statements
implicated the Confrontation Clause at all.2 90 They contended that the victim's
statements to the police were not testimonial, and therefore, whether Giles had
intended to make her unavailable for trial was actually a moot point.291 Justices

283. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
284. Giles v. California (Giles II1), 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).
285. Id.at 2681.
286. Id at 2693.
287. Id at 2683-85.
288. Id.at 2680.
289. See id.
at 2693-94.
290. Id. Justice Thomas's concurring opinion argued that the statements in question did not
implicate the Confrontation Clause because they were nontestimonial. Id.at 2693. In his opinion,
the statements were "indistinguishable from the statements made during police questioning in
response to the report of domestic violence" addressed in Davis. Id. In both cases there was no
"formalized dialogue" to suggest that the statements were intended to be used in court at a later
time. Id. Justice Alito also filed a concurring opinion agreeing with the plurality's analysis of the
forfeiture doctrine but questioned whether the statements fell within the scope of the Confrontation
Clause. Id.at 2694.
291. Id. at 2693-94.
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Souter and Ginsburg joined in a partial concurrence that accepted Justice Scalia's
historical framework of the forfeiture doctrine but declined to unite with the
portion of the opinion that dissected the dissent's arguments. 292 Finally, Justice
Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens and Kennedy, dissented.293 They disagreed
with the Crawfordformulation altogether and argued that the Court should craft a
case-by-case exception to the Confrontation Clause. 9
The plurality opinion opened with a statement that the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause is "most naturally read as a reference to the right of
confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions established at the
time of the founding., 295 According to Justice Scalia, the common law allowed
the admissibility of two forms of unconfronted testimonial statements:
(1) declarations made by a speaker "who was both on the brink of death and
aware that he was dying" 296 and (2) "statements of a witness who was 'detained'
or 'kept away' by the 'means or procurement' of the defendant." 297 He identified
298
the second exception as the common-law doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.
He quickly concluded that the out-of-court statement in question was not a dying
declaration 299 and moved to the main question presented: whether
the statements
300
were admissible under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.
Justice Scalia's analysis of the forfeiture doctrine's origin began by
examining the very same seventeenth-century common-law cases that we
discussed above. 30 1 He pored over Lord Morley's Case, Harrison's Case, and
Queen v. Scaife to determine what sort of events triggered the forfeiture
exception's application. 3 02 He noted that these cases applied the forfeiture
exception where the witness was "kept back" or "detained" by "means or
procurement" of the accused.30 3 According to his reading, English judges used
these terms to limit the scope of the forfeiture exception to situations where the
"defendant' 30 4engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from
testifying.

He noted that there are two dictionary definitions for the key term
"procure. ' 3°5 One, from two nineteenth-century dictionaries, is "to obtain,
gain,

292. Id. at 2694-95.
293. Id. at 2695.
294. Giles v. California (Giles III), 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2707 (2008).
295. Id. at 2682 (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)).

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.
Id. at 2683.
Id. at 2683, 2687-88.
Id. at 2683.
Id. at 2682.

301. Id. at 2683-84, 2687, 2689-90.

302. Id. at 2683.
303. Id.
304. Giles v. California (Giles 111), 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2683 (2008).

305. Id.
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cause, bring on ' 30 6 or "to obtain, gain ... to seek or find., 30 7 He acknowledged
that this definition does not support the inclusion of an intent element.30 8 It does
not characterize "procure" as requiring specific intent to achieve a particular
result and would allow the forfeiture exception to apply whenever the
defendant's voluntary wrongful act caused the witness's absence. 30 9 A more
limiting definition of "procure," taken from a nineteenth-century American
dictionary and a twentieth-century edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, and
ultimately adopted by Justice Scalia, is "to contrive and effect" or "[t]o contrive
or devise with care (an action or proceeding). 3 1 °
Justice Scalia also cited A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law, by J.
Chitty, and A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, by S. Phillipps, both published in
the nineteenth century, to support his conclusion that the second definition
"limit[ing] the causality to one that was designed to bring about the result
was controlling at the founding.3' 2 These treatises, which were
procured '
compiled more than 100 years after the common-law decisions in Lord Morley's
Case, Harrison's Case, and Regina v. Scaife, replaced the common-law
triggering term "procure" with "contrive" in their own discussions of the
forfeiture doctrine.3 13 By revising the "procure" language grounded in the
common-law cases, these authors injected an intent element into the forfeiture
analysis that did not previously exist. Combining the noted dictionary definitions
with the treatise writers' distorted analysis, Justice Scalia reached an improper
conclusion when he limited the forfeiture doctrine's application to those
situations where "the defendant [has] schemed to bring about the absence from
trial that he 'contrived.' 3 14 This ill-chosen definition of "procure" explains why
Justice Scalia incorrectly deduced that the element of specific intent is
constitutionally required.

306. See, e.g., NOAH WEBSTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: ABRIDGED FROM
THE AMERICAN DICTIONARY FOR THE USE OF PRIMARY SCHOOLS AND THE COUNTING HOUSE

337

(1833) (defining "procure" as "to obtain, gain, cause, bring on").
307. JOHN CHARLES TARVER, THE ROYAL PHRASEOLOGICAL ENGLISH-FRENCH, FRENCH-ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 578 (1845) (defining "procure" as "to obtain, gain"; "to seek or find"; "to draw upon
us"); SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 571 (1828).

Giles III, 128 S. Ct. at 2683.
Id.
Id. (citing 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
(defining "procure" as "to contrive and effect" (emphasis added)); 12 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 559 (2d ed. 1989) (def. 1(3)) (defining "procure" as "[t]o contrive or devise with care
(an action or proceeding); to endeavour to cause or bring about (mostly something evil) to orfor a
person")).
311. Giles II1, 128 S. Ct. at 2683-84 (citing 1 J. CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE
CRIMINAL LAW 81 (1816) ("kept away by the means and contrivance of the prisoner"); S.
PHILLIPPS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 165 (1814) ("kept out of the way by the means
and contrivance of the prisoner")).
312. Id.
313. Id. at 2684 n.1.
314. Giles v. California (Giles 111), 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2684 (2008).
308.
309.
310.
(1828)
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Justice Scalia's reliance on a number of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century
cases, including King v. Woodcock3 15 and King v. Dingler,3 16 is also misguided.
These cases uniformly fail to show that the accused acted with a motive to
prevent the out-of-court declarant from testifying.31 7 He found it telling that the
prosecutors in those cases did not attempt to argue the admissibility of the out-ofcourt statements on the basis of a forfeiture rule. 318 The thrust of his reasoning
hinges merely on the absence of such claims to conclude that the prosecutors did
not pursue the forfeiture exception because the defendants did not intend to make
the witnesses unavailable.3 19 It is true that in each case the prosecution went to
great lengths to convince the court that the out-of-court statements were
admissible, even though unconfronted, under the dying-declaration exception by
marshalling witnesses to testify that the declarant made the statement under a
reasonable belief of impending death. 320 Nevertheless, to conclude that these
arguments were proffered as a substitute for a forfeiture claim because the
prosecutors could not satisfy the element of intent is plainly wrong. The
nonexistence of a forfeiture claim can be explained as a matter of trial strategy.
For example, the defendant in King v. Woodcock was on trial for murdering
his wife. 321 Shortly after the victim was severely beaten, but forty-eight hours
before she died, a magistrate took her sworn statement, which related to the cause
of her injuries. 2 The court recognized that there were only two types of
statements admissible at law even if unconfronted in court: dying declarations
and examinations of witnesses in the accused's presence under the Marian bail
and committal statutes.323 The wife's statement could not be admitted under the
Marian statutes because the defendant was not present when she made her
statement. 324 The judge instructed the jury to consider the statement only if it
found that it met the dying-declaration requirements. 325 The court made no
mention in its opinion that the prosecution attempted to argue admissibility under
315. King v. Woodcock, (1798) 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (K.B.).
316. King v. Dingler, (1791) 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (K.B.). Accord United States v. Woods, 28 F.
Cas. 762 (C.C.D.C. 1834) (No. 16,760); Smith v. State, 28 Tenn. (9 Hum.) 9 (1848); Lewis v.
State, 17 Miss. (9 S. & M.) 115 (1847); Nelson v. State, 26 Tenn. (7 Hum.) 542 (1847);
Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio 424 (1842); Welbourn's Case, 1 East 358 (P.C. 1792); Thomas
John's Case, 1 East 357 (P.C. 1790).
317. GilesllI, 128 S. Ct. at 2684.
318. Id. at 2685.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 2686 (citing King v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Munf.) 78, 80-81 (1817); Gibson v.
Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Munf.) 111, 116-17 (1817); Anthony v. State, 19 Tenn. (Meigs) 265,
278-79 (1838)).
321. Giles 111, 128 S. Ct. at 2684 (citing Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 352).
322. Id.
323. Id. at 2684-85. As historical background, Marian statutes provided procedure similar to the
present-day sworn deposition. To qualify as admissible, the statement must have been given under
oath in the accused's presence so as to give the accused an opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. For more information, see Robert Kry, Confrontation Under the Marian Statutes: A
Response to ProfessorDavies, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 493 (2007).
324. Giles v. California (Giles 111), 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2685 (2008).
325. Id. (citing Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. at 354).
HeinOnline -- 40 U. Tol. L. Rev. 606 2009

Spring 2009]

DEPARTURE FROM THE COMMONLAW

the forfeiture exception. It is not logical to conclude that the non-inclusion of a
forfeiture claim can be explained by the prosecution's inability to fulfill the intent
element.
The six other cases cited by the plurality all addressed the admissibility of
out-of-court statements on the basis of a dying-declaration exception alone,326
without making reference to their admissibility on the basis of the forfeiture
exception.327 Justice Scalia noted that "[c]ourts in all these cases did not even
consider admitting the statements on the ground that the defendant's crime was to
blame for the witness's absence-even when the evidence establishing that was
overwhelming."' 328 Justice Scalia suggested that if common law recognized the
exception as articulated by the prosecution in this case, the prosecution in the
older common-law cases would have at least argued that the exception allowed
the court to admit unconfronted testimonial out-of-court statements.
Professor Richard Friedman provides a reasonable alternative explanation
for these omissions. 330 He states that the dying-declaration exception is a
manifestation of the forfeiture doctrine that should be limited "by the principle
that the state cannot invoke forfeiture doctrine if it has not taken advantage of
reasonable opportunities to preserve the confrontation right in whole or in
part.",331 He explains that, in each of these cases, the state could have
"reasonably arrange[d] for testimony by the victim subject to confrontation" prior
to his or her death and that the failure to do so justified the statements'
exclusion. 332 He in turn argues that the facts in Giles differ from these cases
because the victim's testimonial statements in Giles were made weeks before the
charged crime's commission, and there was no "settled practice of exclusion" of
out-of-court statements in this situation.3 33 Professor Friedman correctly
is entirely in line with the
concludes that allowing the use of such statements
334
historical development of the common law.
Justice Scalia also rejected the State's formulation of the forfeiture doctrine
in Giles because the doctrine had not been established in American jurisprudence
at the time of the nation's founding. 335 He opined that the forfeiture exception
proposed by the prosecution was not applied until 1985 in United States v.
Rouco. 33 6 In Rouco, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for
killing a special agent of the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
326. Id. (citing Lewis v. State, 17 Miss. (9 S. & M.) 115, 120 (1847) (refusing to admit an outof-court statement on the grounds that there was no evidence that the statement was made by a
declarant who "was sensible that he was on the verge of dissolution")).
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Posting of Richard D. Friedman to The Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.
blogspot.com/2008/06/reflections-on-giles-part-1-history.html (June 27, 2008, 01:39 EST).
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Giles v. California (Giles 11), 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2687 (2007).
336. Id.
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(ATF).337 During a sting operation targeting cocaine, the defendant fatally shot
an undercover ATF agent who had attempted to arrest him.338 The agent had
named the defendant as the cocaine's source during a debriefing session before
the fatal shooting. 339 The trial court allowed the testimony of the agent's
supervisor under the residual-hearsay exception.34 ° On appeal, the defendant
claimed that allowing the agent's supervisor to present the out-of-court statement
source violated the accused's Sixth Amendment
concerning the cocaine's
341
confrontation right.
The Rouco court rejected this claim, finding that the defendant waived his
right to confront and cross-examine the special agent when he killed him.342
Reasoning that the Sixth Amendment "does not stand as a shield to protect the
accused from his own misconduct or chicanery, 343 the Rouco court concluded
that any contrary result would "make a mockery of the system of justice that the
right was designed to protect., 344 Contrary to Justice Scalia's interpretation, this
case forcefully demonstrates that intent to procure a potential witness's
3 45
unavailability is not an element of the confrontation clause framework.
Additionally, Rouco was not the first American court to address the forfeiture
exception as the prosecutors articulated in Giles.346
The Giles plurality noted correctly that the U.S. Supreme Court first applied
a forfeiture exception in Reynolds.34 7 The Reynolds Court held that where 34a8
witness's absence results from the defendant's own "wrongful procurement,
he "is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated"
when the evidence is offered by other means. 349 The Court reasoned that the
"Constitution does not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate
[and this is an] outgrowth of a maxim
consequences of his own wrongful acts ...
based on the principles of common honesty. 35 °
In Giles, Justice Scalia interpreted the Reynolds language narrowly as
allowing the admissibility of prior unconfronted out-of-court statements only in
circumstances "where the defendant had engaged in wrongful conduct designed
to prevent a witness's testimony." 35 According to Justice Scalia, the Reynolds
Court required that there be some indication that the defendant acted with intent
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 985, 987 (1 1th Cir. 1985).
Id.at 985-86.
Id. at 994.
Id.
Id. at 995.
Id
Id. (citing United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1359 (8th Cir. 1976)).
Id. (citing United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)).
See id.
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1879).
Giles v. California (Giles I), 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2687 (2007) (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at

158).
348.
349.
350.
351.

Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158.
Id.
id. at 158-59.
Giles 111, 128 S.Ct. at 2687.
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to cause the witness's unavailability and the Reynolds Court's conclusion was in
line with the common-law rule. 352 Justice Scalia misinterpreted Reynolds
because a fair reading of the opinion demonstrates that the Court focused
exclusively on the accused's voluntary wrongful conduct and not his
motivation.35 3
Justice Scalia also used the FRE to support his understanding of the
constitutional doctrine of forfeiture. 3 54 He observed that the Supreme Court
previously described FRE 804(b)(6) as a rule of evidence that "codifie[d] the
forfeiture doctrine.'" Pointing to various treatises, he observed that all the
commentators concluded that the intent requirement in FRE 804(b)(6) limits the
exception's scope to situations where "the defendant has in mind the particular
purpose of making the witness unavailable. 3 56 With this in mind, he concluded
that FRE 804(b)(6) was intended to mirror the forfeiture doctrine as applied by
common-law English judges in Lord Morley's Case, Harrison's Case, and
Scaife.357
Justice Scalia did not accept the prosecution's formulation of the forfeiture
exception. 358 He contended that if the prosecution's characterization of the
exception is historically correct, "one would have expected it to be routinely
invoked in murder prosecutions like the one here, in which the victim's prior
statements inculpated the defendant," which was not the case. 359 He read the
common law differently, finding that an intent to render a witness unavailable at
trial is the most natural reading of the language used at common law. 360 Justice
Scalia also pointed out the absence of any common-law cases to the contrary and
the common law's uniform exclusion of all unconfronted inculpatory
testimony
36 1
by murder victims, except for the dying-declaration exception.
The fallacy of Justice Scalia's position lies in an incorrect assumption that
the common-law judges limited the definition of "procure" with an element of
intent. 362 He read intent into a term that was not understood as such at common
law. The words "procure" and "procurement," as the courts used in Lord
Morley's Case, Harrison's Case, and Scaife, were carefully crafted to
demonstrate that the standard for the admissibility of unconfronted out-of-court

352.
353.
354.
355.

Id.
See supra Part 1II.A for more discussion.
Giles 111, 128 S. Ct. at 158 (citing FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6)).
Id. (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006)).
356. Id. at 2687-88 (2008) (citing CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
176 (6th ed. 2006); 5 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 8:134, at 235 (3d ed. 2007); 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 804.03[7][b], at 804-32 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2008)).
357. Giles v. California (Giles 111), 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2687 (2007).
358. Id. (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 2687-88.
361. Id. at 2688.
362. Id. at 2683.
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statements under a forfeiture exception was premised exclusively on the
accused's voluntary wrongful act that actually caused the witness's absence.363
Contrary to the plurality's reading of the common law, courts did not require
that the accused intended, was motivated by, or contrived a means to render the
witness unavailable for live in-court testimony. 364 If that were the common-law
judges' view, they could have used, and likely would have used, precise language
to convey design or contrivance rather than leaving their position open to future
interpretation. Common-law cases clearly demonstrate that all that was required
for the forfeiture exception was a causal connection between the accused's
voluntary wrongful act and the witness's unavailability. 365 If the unavailabilitycausing conduct was voluntary, then the witness had been rendered unavailable
"by means or procurement" of the defendant. 366 This interpretation preserves the
defendant's confrontation right where the prosecution is unable to show a causal
link between the accused's act and the witness's absence. This formulation is
also consistent with equity principles that courts will not reward the accused's
wrongful conduct with the exclusion of evidence.
The historical record of American cases does not support Justice Scalia's
position either. In 1856, in Williams v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court
focused on the accused's voluntary wrongful conduct that created the witness's
unavailability at trial.367 The court did not consider the defendant's
intent to
368
render the witness unavailable in applying the forfeiture exception.
The U.S. Supreme Court's forfeiture analysis in Reynolds also did not refer
to intent.369 It focused exclusively on the voluntary nature of the defendant's
conduct. 370 In Reynolds, Chief Justice Waite traced the forfeiture doctrine's
history to Lord Morley's Case, Harrison's Case, and Scaife.371 He also
recognized the doctrine's basis in the equitable common law "maxim that no one
shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong." 372 Despite access to the
same nineteenth-century treatises that Justice Scalia relied on in his opinion in
Giles-those replacing procurement with contrivance-the Reynolds Court
applied the exception as formulated by the common-law judges.37 3 Reynolds
used "wrongful procurement," and not contrivance or design, to explain the
defendant's forfeiture of confrontation rights.374 It explained that "if a witness is
363. See supra Part II for more discussion.
364. Timothy M. Moore, Forfeitureby Wrongdoing: A Survey andan Argument for Its Place in
Florida,9 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 525, 576 (2008).
365. Id.
366. See King v. Morley (Lord Morley's Case), (1666) 6 Eng. Rep. 769, 770-71 (K.B.);
Harrison's Case, (1692) 12 State Trials 833, 853 (Eng.); Regina v. Scaife, (1851) 117 Eng. Rep.
1271, 1276 (Q.B.).
367. 19 Ga. 402, 403 (1856).
368. Id.
369. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159 (1878).
370. Id.
371. Id. at 158.
372. Id. at 159.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 158.
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absent by [the defendant's] own wrongful procurement, [the defendant] cannot
complain if competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of that which he
has kept away." 0
Nowhere did the Reynolds Court condition the admissibility of out-of-court
statements on a showing of intent or design.376 It merely required a nexus
between the accused's act and the witness's unavailability.377 Chief Justice
Waite best expressed this position when he stated that "if there has not been, in
legal contemplation, a wrong committed, the way has not been open for the
introduction of the testimony." 378 Voluntary wrongful conduct, and not intent or
design, cuts off constitutional protections to a defendant where absence of live
in-court testimony is a "legitimate consequence[ ] of his own wrongful acts. 379
Professor Richard Friedman noted in his respected blog that the Giles
decision appears on the surface to be a "major victory for defendants.,, 380 He
suggested, however, that "tthe Giles test-however it develops-may turn out to
be rather easily satisfied." 3 We agree with Professor Friedman that, in practice,
trial courts will fulfill the Giles test by focusing on the defendant's conduct and
then infer intent, particularly in cases of domestic violence.3 82
First, Professor Friedman posits that most courts are "inclined to admit
statements made by a witness who was precluded from testifying in court by the
defendant's own wrongful conduct" and as a result, courts will likely ease the
383
hurdles necessary to fulfill the Giles test for intent by always finding intent.
Second, he argues that the Giles decision will further narrow the types of
statements defined as testimonial to ease the admissibility process. 384 As the
Giles test only applies to testimonial statements, courts will "give an unduly
construction to the term 'testimonial"' to secure the admissibility of virtually any
statement. 385 Third, Professor Friedman suggests that the holding in Giles will
prompt courts to expand the dying-declaration exception that generally has
limited evidentiary use.3 86 He suggests that courts will find that certain out-ofcourt statements qualify as dying declarations in cases where victims do not
actually believe themselves to be on the verge of death.3 87 We find Professor
Friedman's reasoning on this point compelling and agree that eventually courts
will apply Giles in line with the forfeiture position that the prosecution advanced
in Giles.
375. Id.
376. See supra Part III.A for more discussion.
377. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159.
378. Id.
379. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878).
380. Posting of Richard D. Friedman to The Confrontation Blog, http://confrontationright.
blogspot.com/2008/06/reflection-on-giles-part-2-is-giles-bad.html (June 29, 2008, 18:43 EST).
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. 1d.
387. Id.
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VI. THE FORFEITURE RULE IN FRE 804(B)(6) SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED
WITH THE SIXTH AMENDMENT FORFEITURE DOCTRINE

Prior to the 1997 codification of the evidentiary forfeiture rule in FRE
804(b)(6), some federal courts used the residual hearsay exception to admit outof-court statements of an unavailable witness if the proponent made a sufficient
showing that the accused procured the witness's unavailability.3 88 For example,
the Second Circuit, in United States v. Mastrangelo,389 applied the former
residual hearsay exception, FRE 804(b)(5), to admit prior grand jury testimony
after finding that the evidence "was surrounded with sufficient 'particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.' ' 390 While recognizing that the grand jury
statements were hearsay, Judge Winter explained that to not admit the grand jury
the very system of justice the confrontation clause was
testimony "would mock
3 91
designed to protect.

Professors Stephen Saltzburg and David Schlueter first brought the idea to
codify the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine to the Advisory Committee on
Federal Rules of Evidence in 1992. 392 They intended to resolve a federal circuit
split on the nature of the burden of proof to establish that wrongful conduct had
occurred.3 93 Commentary to the new rule explained that the appropriate burden
of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. 39 The Supreme Court approved the
proposed rule on April 11, 1997, and it became effective on December 1, 1997 as
FRE 804(b)(6). 395 The forfeiture rule provides:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness: ...
(6) Forfeiture by wrongdoing. A statement offered against a party that has engaged
or acquiesced in wrongdoing that was396intended to, and did, procure the
unavailability of the declarant as a witness.
The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1997 Amendment expressly limit the
rule's application to "actions taken after the event to prevent a witness from
testifying."' 397 The Advisory Committee Notes suggest that the rule was

388. Flanagan, supra note 81, at 1209-10.
389. 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982).
390. Id. at 272 (quoting United States v. Mastrangelo, 533 F. Supp. 389, 390 (E.D.N.Y 1982)).
391. Id. at 273.
392. Leonard Birdsong, The Exclusion of Hearsay through Forfeiture by Wrongdoing-Old
Wine in a New Bottle-Solving the Mystery of the Codification of the Concept into FederalRule
804(b)(6), 80 NEB. L. REV. 891, 903 (2001).
393. FED. R. EVID. 804 Advisory Committee's Notes to the 1997 Amendment, reprinted in 3
MICHAEL GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 585 (5th ed. 2001).
394. Id.

395, Id.
396. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
397, FED. R. EID. 804 Advisory Committee's Notes to the 1997 Amendment, reprinted in 3
GRAHAM, supra note 393, at 585.
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originally created as a means to prevent witness tampering.398 In fact, the
Advisory Committee chose not to refer to witness tampering in the rule because
it believed that the rule's language and intent requirement very clearly indicated
that the hearsay exception would apply only when the accused acted after his or
her original crime to procure the unavailability of an adverse witness at trial. 399 It
has also been suggested that the rule's drafters never questioned that intent to
render a witness unavailable was an element of the rule.400 The rule includes an
intent requirement and provides that forfeiture will result from conduct of the
accused who engaged in "wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the
unavailability.'
Courts regularly apply the rule as its proponents intended.4 °2 In United
States v. Gray, the defendant appealed her mail-and-wire fraud conviction,
arguing that the trial court violated her confrontation rights by admitting several
out-of-court statements that the deceased made to his family members during the
three months before his murder.40 3 The prosecution claimed that she was
responsible for his murder. 40 4 The court rejected her claim and determined that
FRE 804(b)(6) "applies whenever the defendant's wrongdoing was intended to,
40 5
and did, render the declarant unavailable as a witness against the defendant.,
The court noted that there are no limits "on the subject matter of statements that
can be admitted under [FRE 804(b)(6)], ' '4° and therefore the rule accomplishes
from intimidating or 'taking care of potential
its purpose "'to deter criminals
07
witnesses against them."4
398. Flanagan, supra note 81, at 1213. See also United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 962
(7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the forfeiture doctrine is an equitable principle and "the primary
reasoning behind the rule is obvious-to deter criminals from intimidating or 'taking care of
potential witnesses against them').
399. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) Advisory Committee's Note (Apr. 22, 1996).
400. Flanagan, supra note 81, at 1213.
401. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6) (emphasis added).
402. E.g., United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227, 242 (4th Cir. 2005).
403. Id. at 240. "A grand jury indicted [defendant] Josephine Gray on five counts of mail fraud
and three counts of wire fraud...." Id. at 230. Gray told her new friend, Wilson, that she killed her
former husband to escape his abuse. Id. at 231. Shortly after his death, Gray claimed benefits from
her late husband's life insurance policy. Id. During her marriage to her late husband, the defendant
had an affair with another man, Robert Gray. Id. After her late husband's death, the couple used
the insurance proceeds to purchase a home; however, Robert Gray left the home because he was
afraid that the defendant was trying to kill him to collect on his life insurance policy, which named
the defendant as the beneficiary. Id. Shortly thereafter, Robert Gray was found dead, shot once in
the chest and once in the neck. Id. at 231-32. Gray told Wilson that she also had to kill Goode, her
cousin and boyfriend, because he helped her with Robert Gray's murder and wanted a part of the
insurance money that Gray received from his insurance policy in return for his silence. Id. at 232.
At the close of the evidence at trial, a jury found Gray guilty on all counts and sentenced her to
forty years in prison. Id. at 230.
404. Id. at 233 ("The indictment alleged that Gray 'intentionally caused the death[]' of ...
Robert Gray.
405. Id. at 241.
406. Id. (citing 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE,

§ 507.1, at 268 (2d ed. Supp. 2004)).
407. Id. at 242 (quoting United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 962 (7th Cir. 2002)).
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The court recognized that the rule's language "requires that the wrongdoing
was intended to render the declarant unavailable as a witness '40 8 and held that "a
'4 9
defendant need only intend 'in part' to procure the declarant's unavailability.A
"[I]t is sufficient in this regard to show that the [defendant] was motivated in part
by a desire to silence the witness; the intent ''
to4x deprive the prosecution of
testimony need not be the actor's sole motivation.
We argue that the intent element in FRE 804(b)(6) creates a distinct
evidentiary condition for admissibility. This condition should not be confused
with the equitable common-law notion of forfeiture, which underlies the
constitutional forfeiture doctrine. The intent element in FRE 804(b)(6) is
directed at witness tampering that results from the accused's post-crime
intentional conduct. Unlike the Sixth Amendment forfeiture rule, FRE 804(b)(6)
would not apply where there is insufficient evidence to show, at least in part, an
intent to procure a witness's unavailability. This is supported by Professor
Saltzburg's commentary to the 1997 amendment explaining that before the rule
can apply "it must be shown that the party against whom the evidence is offered
4 11
acted with intent to procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.
He reasons that where a "defendant kills a declarant simply because he didn't
like him, or because he was burned in a drug deal by him, then the defendant has
not forfeited his right to object to the declarant's hearsay statement [under the
rule]. 4 12
In the equitable common-law forfeiture analysis, the basis for the
constitutional principle, intent is not a relevant consideration. 413 A court will find
that the accused forfeits his Sixth Amendment confrontation right whenever it is
sufficiently shown that the unavailability of live in-court testimony is the direct
result of his or her voluntary and wrongful act.414
Indeed, Justice Scalia clarified in Crawford that "we do not think the
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the
rules of evidence. 41 5 For this reason, the determination of "whether defendant
has forfeited his constitutional right of confrontation is an issue separate from
whether a particular rule of evidence has been satisfied. ' 4 16 While FRE
804(b)(6) contains an intent requirement, the Sixth Amendment forfeiture
doctrine is derived independently from the common law, which does not contain
an element of intent.4 17 The constitutional forfeiture doctrine is not a means of

408. Id.
409. Id.
410. United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1279 (1st Cir. 1991).
411. Fed. R. EVID. 804, Commentary of Stephen A. Saltzburg et al.
412. Id.
413. See John R. Kroger, The Confrontation Waiver Rule, 76 B.U. L. REV. 835, 888-93 (1996).
414. See Timothy M. Moore, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing: A Survey and an Argument for Its
Place in Florida,9 FLA. COASTAL L. REv. 525, 532-34 (2008).
415. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
416. State v. Bauder, 712 N.W.2d 506, 514 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
417. United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Crawford, 541
U.S. at 61).
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circumventing the hearsay rule or allowing statements in evidence that would
normally not be admissible.41 8 The constitutional doctrine has a broader purpose
and represents sound public policy to penalize the accused if his or her voluntary
and wrongful actions subvert the legal system. The loss of the right of
confrontation prevents the accused from gaining an unfair advantage in the
adversarial contest through his or her voluntary and wrongful act. Ultimately, the
rule promotes the truth-finding process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Giles is inconsistent with the original
common-law cases that created and developed the forfeiture exception.
Common-law judges based their forfeiture rule on an equitable maxim that
focused exclusively on the accused's voluntary wrongful act rather than on intent
or motivation. Since the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the forfeiture rule in
Reynolds, American case law elevated the common-law forfeiture principle into a
constitutional doctrine that remained faithful to its equitable foundation and
public policy concern "that no person should benefit from his own wrongful
acts., 41 As we have demonstrated throughout this article, equitable forfeiture
"does not hinge on the wrongdoer's motive. ' 42° From this perspective, forfeiture
is nothing more than judicially imposed punishment for the accused's voluntary
and wrongful conduct in rendering the unavailability of the out-of-court
declarant's live in-court testimony,
' 421 especially in circumstances where the "intentto-silence element is missing.
The courts that agreed with the California Supreme Court in Giles are
correct to separate the constitutional forfeiture doctrine from FRE 804(b)(6)'s
evidentiary approach.422 Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Giles incorrectly
injected an element of intent to the constitutional analysis in derogation of the
equitable principles that underlie the constitutional forfeiture rule. 4 23 Since the
the rule as one of "forfeiture" and not
U.S. Supreme Court previously labeled
"waiver" in both Crawford and Davis,424 Giles was incorrectly decided when the
plurality added an intent element.

418. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
419. People v. Giles (Giles I1), 152 P.3d 433, 443 (2007), vacated, Giles v. California (Giles
11), 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).
420. Id. at 442.
421. Id. at 443.
422. Id. at 442 (citing United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 1991), and noting
that despite a holding that intent, as least in part, was required, none of the cases held that intent
was required under the Sixth Amendment equitable forfeiture framework).
423. Id. at 443.
424. Id. at 444.
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